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Why do firms choose to locate in the informal sector?  Researchers often argue that 
the high cost of regulation prevents informal firms from becoming formal and 
productive.  Our results point to a more nuanced story.   
 
Using data from surveys of microenterprises in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, we find that the labor productivity of 
informal firms is virtually indistinguishable from that of formal firms in East Africa, but 
very different in Southern Africa. We provide a theoretical model to explain this 
result, based on the key assumption that firms may evade taxes subject to a cost (or 
concealment cost) that is increasing and convex in the firm’s employment size.  
Consequently, the productivity distributions reflect the differences in concealment 
costs and the opportunity cost of formality.  Greater enforcement of laws and better 
provision of services such as finance and electricity to formally registered firms in 
Southern Africa means that firms are more likely to register; those that do not are 
likely to be operating as “survivalist” firms. But in East Africa, weak enforcement of 
tax payment and no significant difference in access to services between formal and 
informal firms means that these variables do not explain the allocation of firms 
across the informal-formal divide. 
 
We conclude that in countries with weak business environments, informal firms are 
just as likely as formal firms to increase their productivity as they grow.  Thus, 
interventions to increase productivity and lower the cost of formality may be helpful.  
But in countries with strong business environments such as those in Southern Africa, 
owners of informal firms are likely to be better off entering the labor market as wage 
labor.  In the latter case, investment in education or vocational training is probably 
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Informal firms account for a large share of employment in most developing countries, 
often a dominant share.  What drives the choice of whether a firm is informal or formal? 
How is that decision impacted by existing Government regulations and policies towards 
the MSME sector, and by the characteristics of the firms themselves?   How should 
informal firms be considered – as a mainspring of future growth and employment 
generation or as a “survivalist” employment alternative?  Are there implications for 
policymaking?  
 
This paper considers these questions for a set of countries in Southern and Eastern Africa, 
using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys carried out in these countries in 
recent years.   These surveys have been completed for formal businesses in some 20 Sub-
Saharan African (African) countries since 2005, and have been complemented by surveys 
for informal businesses in 10 of these countries.  The content of the surveys has not been 
the same of course; far more detail is asked of formal firms in areas relating to 
production, costs, productivity and profitability.  However, the surveys contain a number 
of similar questions, making it possible to derive some conclusions about the nature of 
formalization.  In this paper, we use data from 7 of the countries in which surveys have 
been undertaken.   
 
To provide a framework for the empirical analysis, Section 2 of the paper discusses a 
model of the determinants of the formalization decision.  Like other decisions, many 
researchers view this decision as reflecting the balance of benefits and costs of 
formalization--for example, access to credit versus tax liability. This balance will depend 
on the formal regulatory framework but also on the capability and effort made by the 
state to enforce regulations.  If tax inspectors can be bribed and firms not registered for 
taxes can also settle their problems by bribing inspectors, there may be little real 
difference whatever the formal tax rates.  In any given country, the balance can also 
depend on the characteristics of the firm (or the entrepreneur).  Some entrepreneurs may 
face different opportunity costs of being in business; some might also be better placed 
than others to achieve the potential access and productivity gains that come with 
formalization.  We formulate a model that allows us to determine how firms “sort” into 
the formal vs. the informal sector.   
 
Section 3 picks up on the empirical analysis.  One question, on which studies are not 
unanimous, is how to define “formal”.  We use a uniform definition based on registration 
for taxes.  We present some descriptive statistics for three sets of firms:  formal micro-
enterprises (5 employees or less), informal micro-enterprises (also 5 employees or less), 
and formal small firms with 5 to 10 employees.   These are compared across the seven 
countries:  a Southern group consisting of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana and an 
Eastern group, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, and Rwanda.   
 
Each country is unique, and there are important differences between countries in each 
group.  Nevertheless, there appear to be systematic differences between the two groups, 
and these suggest very different stories in Southern and Eastern Africa.  In particular, 2 
 
informal firms seem to be more “survivalist” in the former region, and more likely to be 
potential sources of growth and employment generation in the latter one where the main 
differences are between smaller and larger firms rather than formal and informal firms.  
Indeed, the decision of whether to formally register or not may be quite an idiosyncratic  
one in the East African group, in contrast to the Southern Africa group where informal 
firms are truly less productive than other types of firms.  Why this should be so is an 
interesting question, and we hypothesize that it reflects a combination of weak delivery of 
the services that are supposed to flow from formalization combined with weak ability to 
enforce formalization.  Rwanda displays some distinctive characteristics relative to these 
two groups.  Interestingly, some of the differences implied by the micro-data appear to be 
consistent with country-level characteristics, including from “Doing Business” and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators.   
 
Section 4 looks at the role of human capital and the business environment in the sorting 
of firms into formality and informality.  We consider the costs of informality (avoidance 
of taxes and laws) and the benefits of formality (access to electricity, water, sewage, and 
finance) across the seven countries in our sample. 
 
Section 5 summarizes, and draws some implications for policy.  These differ between the 
Southern and Eastern groups.  In particular, we argue that the differences between formal 
and informal firms in the Southern group reflect the characteristics of the entrepreneurs 
and labor force.  Most of the survivalist firms in the informal sector (which is not to be 
confused with the small-scale sector) are unlikely to become formal firms.  While certain 
initiatives may ease the situation of these firms, the approach towards improving the 
living standards of those engaged in this sector are most likely to be found in increasing 
access to employment in the formal sector, whether through temporary wage subsidies or 
other mechanisms.  On the other hand, improvements in the business environment in East 
Africa are potentially more valuable in changing the balance of benefits and costs from 
formalization, and so encouraging small firms to formalize and grow.   
 3 
 
2.  A comparison of productivity in the informal and formal sector in seven African 
countries 
 
Enterprise surveys covering the formal sector conducted for African countries cover only 
the formal sector and firms with a minimum employment level of 5 employees, but 
surveys in several countries have included a separate survey of microenterprises-those 
with less than five employees.   For various reasons, notably the small size of 
establishments, their expected high rate of turnover, the high level of “informality” of 
establishments in many activities and consequently the difficulty of obtaining trustworthy 
information from official sources, an aerial sampling approach is used to estimate the 
population of establishments and select the sample in this stratum for all regions of the 
survey.  Table 1 describes the sample of firms used in this analysis.
1  Appendix 1 
describes the sampling methodology. 
 
Table 1: Sample Sizes 
 Botswana  Namibia  South 
Africa 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda  Rwanda 
Informal 
micro 
54  72 53 90 28 46 23 
Formal 
micro 
48  28 67 34 37 54 105 
Total 
micro 
102  100 120 124 65  100 128 
Total 
formal 
342  329 937 657 419 563 212 
 
While enterprises in very small size classes are commonly referred to as “informal”, a 
part of the firms with less than 5 employees in our sample is indeed classified as formal.  
This raises the question of how the boundary between formal and informal firms should 
be defined.  Enterprises in the micro size class were asked about their registration status. 
Firms were asked whether they had:  
 
•  registered name with the Office of the Registrar or other government 
institutions responsible for approving company names,  
•  registered with the Office of the Registrar, the local courts, or other 
government institutions responsible for commercial registration,  
•  an operating or trade license or otherwise registered for a general business 
license with any municipal agency,  
                                                 
1 We know that there will be some firms with more than 5 employees that are not registered for tax 
purposes in our small-firm sample.   But the scope of this paper is to look at the determinants of formality 
amongst microenterprises; thus the bulk of the analysis is confined to this subset of firms. 4 
 
•  obtained a tax identification number from the tax administration or other 
agency responsible for tax registration. 
In all the countries in our sample, only a subset of firms in the first three categories are 
registered for tax purposes. We define firms are registered for taxes to be formal 
microenterprises, they are defined as informal otherwise. This distinction of 
microenterprises into these two categories follows earlier studies. It is clear that to grow 
into larger size classes, a firm must first formalize its operations by registering with tax 
authorities.  
As a first step towards looking at the differences between formal and informal firms, we 
look at a simple measure of productivity—value added per worker—of informal 
microenterprises, formal microenterprises and formal small firms in each of the seven 
countries in our sample.   
Figure 1: Labor productivity of firms in the sample (median) 
 
 
We begin our analysis by examining productivity differences across firm groups within 
countries.   Figure 1 presents the median productivity between microenterprises and 
formal sector small firms in our sample.  We see that, between Southern and Eastern 
Africa, differences in formal sector productivity are much greater than differences in 
microenterprise productivity.  There are other large gaps as well--formal microenterprises 
are more productive in Southern Africa compared to their informal counterparts, and 
much more productive than formal microenterprises in Eastern Africa.  
 However, median values present only part of the picture. The dispersions around the 
median provide further information on the nature of enterprise performance, and 
competitiveness of the sector.  Figures 2-8 show kernel density estimations for labor 
productivity across the three types of firms in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia 
(Southern Africa) and in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (East Africa) and Rwanda.   
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A striking feature of the figures below is that in some countries the probability density of 
labor productivity is bimodal along the formal vs. informal firms divide but not in others. 
Labor productivity is lower in informal firms on average in every country sample, and the 
density of labor productivity in those firms also significantly overlaps the density for 
formal firms. But the degree of overlap also varies a great deal from country sample to 
country sample, being much smaller in samples from Southern Africa than it is in country 
samples from East Africa. It is possible that this has something to do with differences in 
survey sample designs, but we also know that the sample design is reasonably 
standardized across countries. It is therefore likely that the smaller extent of overlap in 
labor productivity across the formal-informal divide in Southern Africa reflects 
differences in the structure and workings of the economies of the two regions. 
Specifically we hypothesize that it may indicate that governments in Southern Africa 
enforce business tax laws and codes of regulation more than their counterparts do in 
Eastern Africa and that the formal environment provides better services.   
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Kenya
Kernel Density Estimate of Value Added Per Worker
 
 





















4 6 8 10 12
Tanzania





















4 6 8 10 12
Uganda
Kernel Density Estimate of Value Added Per Worker
 
 
For the three countries in Southern Africa, the difference in labor productivity between 
formal and informal micro-firms is especially stark for South Africa.  There the density 
functions barely overlap, and productivity in the modal formal firm is several times 
higher than in the modal informal firm. Indeed, in South Africa there almost no 
difference between the productivity density functions for micro formal firms and small 
formal firms.  In Botswana and Namibia, the picture is muddier, yet with some 
similarities.  
 
In contrast, the East African pattern is one with a large productivity overlap between 
firms that are informal versus those that are formally registered microenterprises. In 
Kenya there is some difference between formal and informal micro densities, but there is 
a great deal of overlap in Uganda and Tanzania; indeed, there is little or no difference 
between the densities for formal and informal micro-firms in these countries.  In Uganda 7 
 
the overlap is almost total across all three types of firms.  In Tanzania and particularly 
Kenya, small firms tend to be somewhat more productive than micro firms.   
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Rwanda
Kernel Density Estimate of Value Added Per Worker
 
 
Rwanda is clearly a special case (Figure 8).  As in Southern Africa, productivity of 
informal micro-firms is lower than for the formal micro and small firms.  However, 
because of the stringent enforcement of registration requirements and punitive penalties 
for non-registration, there are almost no real informal micro firms in Rwanda.  The 
survey found only 23 such firms, all very small and engaged in fringe activities.   Alone 
among the countries, in this case the question of whether or not to register cannot be 
regarded as a practical choice; the question appears to be more one of whether or not to 
establish a business.     
 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show the kernel density estimations aggregated across East and 
Southern Africa. .
2  The picture is clear—in East Africa, informal and formal firms have 
more or less the same level of productivity; in Southern Africa, the picture is starkly 
different.  It is also interesting to note that informal firms in Southern Africa look very 
similar to informal firms in East Africa, but formal firms are far more productive in 




Figure 9  Figure 10 
                                                 
2 It is not strictly correct to pool data across the countries because of variations in price parity.  One 
possibility is that the distributions overlap due to very high costs of informality that lead to the exit of the 
least efficient firms in the informal sector.  But as we show below, the costs (and opportunity costs) of 






3. A Simple Framework for Understanding Productivity Differences 
 
Perhaps the most visible proponent of the cost-benefit view of formalization is Hernando 
de Soto.   In his seminal analysis, The Mystery of Capital, he argues: 
 
"Extra legal businesses are taxed by the lack of good property law and continually having 
to hide their operations from the authorities. Because they are not incorporated, extralegal 
entrepreneurs cannot lure investors by selling shares; they cannot get low interest formal 
credit because they do not even have legal addresses. They cannot reduce risks by 
declaring limited liability or obtaining insurance coverage. In fact, the only 'insurance' 
available to them is that provided by their neighbors and the protection that local bullies 
or mafia are willing to sell them. Moreover, because extralegal entrepreneurs live in 
constant fear of government detection and extortion from corrupt officials, they are 
forced to split and compartmentalize their production facilities between many locations, 
thereby rarely achieving important economies of scale. With one eye always on the 
lookout for police, underground entrepreneurs cannot openly advertise to build up their 
clientele or make less costly bulk deliveries to customers."  
 
The question then is why firms choose to endure this situation.  DeSoto concluded that 
informal actors remained out of the formal economy due to the cost imposed by the 
regulatory structure within the country (DeSoto, 2000). Increasing unemployment, either 
through loss of public sector jobs or a growing labor force, has also been cited as a factor 
for the growth of the informal economy, which serves as a social safety net for the 
unemployed.
3 Whatever the mix of reasons, the informal economy in Africa is indeed 
large, both in terms of the number of enterprises as well as its contribution to GDP.  
Schneider estimates it to be about a third of total economic activity (Schneider, xx).   
 
                                                 
3 .  Recent unemployment estimates for the seven countries in this study range from 23% (for 
Botswana) to 56% (for Kenya).  9 
 
The past few decades have witnessed the emergence of a large volume of literature on the 
informal sector. The literature is quite diverse, covering informal labor (Almeida, 2005; 
Chen, 2004), tax policy (Ihrig and Moe, 2004; Emram and Stiglitz, 2004), as well as 
corruption (Johnson et al, 1998; Marcouiller and Young, 1995).  Many researchers argue 
that firms locate in the informal sector because the manager/entrepreneur believes that the 
benefits of informality outweigh the costs (Djankov et al 2002; Loayza et al 2005; 
Ishengoma and Kappel 2006).  Djankov et al enumerate benefits and costs of informality 
and conclude that regulatory barriers must be lowered to encourage formalization.  Gatti 
and Honorati look at informal firms in 49 developing countries to investigate the role of 
access to credit and external finance. The authors find that more tax compliance is 
significantly associated with more access to credit and that the link between credit and 
formality is stronger in “high-formality” countries (Gatti and Honorati, 2008).  Arterido 
et al find that a weak business environment shifts downward the size distribution of firms 
and that poor quality finance and business regulation reduces the employment growth of 
micro and small firms in particular. They argue that significant reforms are needed to for 
micro firms to cross over into the category of SMEs (Arterido et al, 2007). 
 
Loayza et al discuss the informal economy as a result of excessive taxes and regulation.  
They study the determinants and effects in an endogenous growth model and find that the 
size of the informal sector depends positively on the proxies for tax burden and labor 
restrictions and negatively on a proxy of the quality of government institutions.   This 
model was tested using country level data in Latin America (Loayza et al 2005).  
Fajnzylber et al (2005) look at the effect of improvements in the business environment on 
the performance of microenterprises in Mexico.  Ishengoma and Kappel (2006) set up a 
formalization model around the costs and benefits in the business environment (formal 
and informal).  They then assess approaches to encourage formalization in this paradigm 
and make recommendations for specific measures.  Implicit is many of these analyses is 
the notion that informality impedes growth and acts as a drag on productivity.
4  
Shleifer and LaPorta argue that informal firms are neither capable of crossing over to 
formality when registration costs are lowered nor are they a burden on society (Shleifer 
and LaPorta, 2008).  According to Shleifer and LaPorta, “there is very little support for 
the romantic view, and indeed the differences in productivity between the formal and 
informal firms are so large that it is very hard to believe that the registration of 
unregistered firms would eliminate the gap.  On the other hand, there is not much support 
for the parasite view, either, and the evidence suggests that beefing up “enforcement” 
against the unofficial firms would devastate the livelihood of millions of people surviving 
near subsistence. The evidence rather points to the dual view, with the fairly standard 
                                                 
4 Fafchamps (1994) discusses six factors that may govern this choice.  Fafchamps argues that the observed 
informality is only a short-run disequilibrium phenomenon; however, given that the number of firms in 
each of these countries in this sector has grown rapidly, this is unlikely to be the case.  High transport costs 
may limit a firm’s market, it therefore produces on a small scale. However, this alone, cannot determine 
informality.  Market failures, information asymmetries and management requirements play a role as well--
in each case, the demands are fewer on informal enterprises.  Government policies and regulations such as 
registration procedures, costs, tax laws, labor regulations, worker safety laws can be avoided by informal 
firms.  Informal firms, with flexible technologies, can adjust more easily to market demand.  And finally, 
large scale production requires managerial skills that entrepreneurs may not have. 10 
 
implication that the hope of economic development lies in the creation of large registered 
firms, run by educated managers and utilizing modern practices, including modern 
technology, marketing, and finance.” 
Are regulatory costs the driver of the decision to formalize?  If so, why do we observe so 
little difference in productivity between informal and formal firms in East Africa relative 
to Southern Africa?  In this section we spell out a partial equilibrium model of business 
informality that provides an explanation of the difference in labor productivity between 
informal and formal firms in Southern Africa and the contrast it bears to East Africa, 
where the overlap between the densities of the formal and informal sectors is almost 





We begin with a two factor model, following Lucas (1978).  Factor prices are assumed to 
be given and fixed, along with the distribution of the workforce between employees and 
entrepreneurs. Our focus is on the sorting of observed entrepreneurs between the formal 
and the informal sectors rather than the question of selection into entrepreneurship which 
was the main focus in the Lucas model.  In the next few paragraphs we describe our 
model and the key propositions that are derived from it.  Appendix 2 describes each of 
the propositions in detail.   
 
As in Lucas (1978), “managerial talent” level,x is drawn from a fixed distribution 
] 1 , 0 [ : → Γ
+ R . A firm in the economy consists of a single entrepreneur, managing n 
identical employees, who use k  units of homogenous capital to produce  y  units of net 
output by means of a two-level production function given by  )] , ( [ k n f xg y = , where  
+ + → R R g f : ,  and each of   f  and g  is twice differentiable, increasing and strictly 
concave, with  0 ) 0 ( = g . We also assume that the production technology  f   is one of 
constant returns to scale so that, denoting factor proportion  as 
n
k
r = , ) ( ) , ( r n k n f φ = , 
where 
+ + → R R : φ  is also twice differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.  Firm 
face an identical wage rate, w, in the labor market and a uniform rental price for capital 
services, u , and are assumed to maximize profits in their production and hiring decisions. 
 
 
Following Fortin et al. (1997), we assume that all firms are required to pay a profit tax at 
the uniform rate of  π t  and a payroll tax w t .  Firms may evade both taxes subject to a cost 
of evasion (or concealment cost) that is increasing and convex in the firm’s employment 
size.  The concealment cost can be described as   ) (n c c =  such that  0 ) ( ), (
' ' ' > n c n c .  We 
assume that all formal firms pay both taxes while all informal firms evade both.   
 
The degree of convexity varies with the overall strength with business environment.  It is 
greater in countries where regulations and laws are better enforced, both because 11 
 
detection is more difficult to avoid and because the opportunity costs of informality, in 
the form of access to services enabled through formalization, are higher.     
 
 It follows from our assumptions that for any firmx, profits are given by   
 
(1a)       [] uk wn t r n xg t w f − + − − = ) 1 ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( φ π π  
 
if the firm operates formally, and by  
 
(1b)    uk wn n c r n xg i − − − = ) ( )) ( ( φ π  
if x is choose to be informal instead.  If   x  is in the formal sector, its input demands 
would maximize (1a), for which the first order conditions are 
 
(2a)   w t r r r r n xg w) 1 ( )] ( ) ( )][ ( [
' ' + = − φ φ φ   
 and 
(3)  u r r n xg = ) ( )] ( [
' ' φ φ , 
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 Equation (4a) defines the factor proportion, r  as an implicit function of factor prices and 
shows that formal sector firms should exhibit uniform capital intensity under our 
technological assumptions.  
 
The firm’s labor demand function is implicitly defined by each of equations (2a) and (3), 
and is of the form  ) , , , ( u t w x n n w f f = .Because of the uniformity of r ,  the profit 
maximizing demand for capital services is  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( u t w x rn u t w x k k w f w f f = = . 
Employment size is therefore a reliable indicator of the scale of output of formal firms.  
 
Since the cost of concealment is a function of firm size, for informal firms (3) will still be 
one of the first order conditions for its input demands, but equation (2a) will not be. The 
other first order condition will be 
 
(2b) ) ( )] ( ) ( )][ ( [
' ' ' n c w r r r r n xg + = − φ φ φ  
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which shows thatr  is not uniform for informal firms since it depends on n and, hence, 
on x.  Still, (2b) and (3) together implicitly define the two factor demand functions with 
, ,w x   u  as the sole arguments when x is an informal firm. The labor demand function is 
now of form  ) , , , ( u w x n n i i =  
to which corresponds an capital input demand function of the form  ) , , , ( u w x k k i i =  
 
The labor demands  f n   and  i n   have the standard property of strictly decreasing in w 
and u .  They are also both strictly increasing inx. The result in Lucas (1978) that more 
talented entrepreneurs run larger businesses thus holds in this setting too, applying in the 
informal sector as well as in the formal sector. 
5  
 
Substituting for input demands  into equation (1) gives entrepreneurial rent in formal 
sector as   ) , , , , ( π π π t t u w x w f f = .This is a standard profit function except that managerial 
talent x (scaled down by profit taxes) plays the role that output price would in an 
ordinary profit function, as we are using output as the numeraire. Profits are therefore 
strictly increasing in x by the envelope theorem and strictly decreasing in both factor 
prices and the two tax rates. Thus, not only do more talented managers run larger 
businesses, they also earn more entrepreneurial rent than those who run smaller firms.  
 
Obviously these properties also carry over to the entrepreneurial rent function of the 
informal sector. This is obtained by substituting for labor and capital input  ) , , ( u w x ni  and 
) , , ( u w x ki , respectively, in equation (1b), which leads to  ) , , ( u w x i i π π =  
 
Each of  f π  and  i π   is defined for all entrepreneurs  0 : x x x ≥  for each of which 
obviously only one of the two variables is realized. We assume that the other is 
nonetheless known to the entrepreneur as a notional value and that x is in the formal 
sector if   ) , , ( ) , , , , ( u w x t t u w x i w f π π π ≥  and in the informal sector otherwise. 
                                                 
5 There may be an additional sorting mechanism relating to labor.  In the Lucas model (and also the 
other papers) the workforce is homogeneous with respect to productivity as an employee.  The only 
personal differences are those relating to management.  In the Lucas model end, the better managers get 
sucked into management and they also therefore earn more than they would as employees.  However, in the 
Rauch model it is not so simple.  There, the workforce is still homogeneous in terms of labor productivity, 
but some informal sector managers earn less than the minimum wage in the formal sector and would like to 
be formal sector employees. In practice however, we know that there is an important difference in the real 
world.  Especially in the education dimension, the same factors that will make a manager more productive 
will also increase employee productivity and wages, especially with the large wage gradient in the formal 
sector.  There will therefore be another selection process operating on managers, but through the labor 
market, if an informal business cannot generate enough surplus to compensate an educated person.  This 
might be considered as another opportunity cost of informalization, and the convexity will depend on the 
degree of wage premium for an educated person.  In East Africa, it may be the case that the gradient is not 
as steep or the formal sector is not big enough to absorb all educated applicants so that many of these 
become informal entrepreneurs.  For example, Fox and Oviedo show that the wage differences between 
unskilled and skilled production workers is much higher in Namibia and Botswana versus Tanzania and 
Uganda (Fox and Oviedo, 2008). 13 
 
This is the sorting rule motivating the econometric estimations that are presented in 
Section 4.   
 
The key propositions of our model are as follows: 
 
Proposition 1: The entrepreneurs with the greatest managerial talent  are always in the 
formal sector.  
 
Proposition 2 : Higher taxes would push more talented entrepreneurs into the informal 
sector. 
 
Proposition 3: Informal firms are always smaller than formal firms. 
 
Proposition 4: There is discontinuity between the size distribution of formal firms and 
informal firms. 
 
Proposition 5: Informal entrepreneurs earn less than formal entrepreneurs. 
 
Proposition 6: Informal firms are less productive than formal firms. 
 
Proposition 7: The distribution of labor productivity of firms in the formal and informal 
sectors overlap with each other. 
 
Proposition 8:  The extent of this overlap decreases in the convexity of concealment costs 
in the informal sector. 
 
 
Our model may not capture all the nuances of the decision to formalize.  Other factors 
that drive this decision may include the following: 
 
•  Different business climates will have different costs and benefits of 
formality/informality.  This may in turn give rise to differential probabilities of 
access to services such as electricity, or finance.  Also, the quality of the service 
even if firms have access may vary across firms and regions.  Furthermore, 
protection from predatory officials and the ability to evade taxes may vary. 
 
•  In the limit, there may be no clear difference when both regimes are very 
uncertain and arbitrary (Emery, 2005).  In this case, it is not clear what formal or 
informal means.  We would not expect a sorting effect with better managers 
choosing formality in the limit case. 
 
 
•  This points us towards a directly stochastic model, where self-selection 
probabilities depend on multiple expected differences and firm characteristics. 
   14 
 
•  In our model, c(.) can be expanded to include a wider range of opportunity costs 
of informality (generally higher in better business climates and especially for 
more talented managers)  but the function might look very different. 
 
•  Finally, we note that the opportunity cost of informality is also higher for skilled 
persons (whether potential managers or employees) if there is a steep pay gradient 
in the formal sector. This raises the hurdle for the informal sector to retain skilled 
individuals. 
 
We now turn to empirical tests of the propositions identified by our model. 
 
 




First, let us look at whether there is sorting by differences in the level of managerial 
talent, as proxied by educational attainment.  Figure 11 compares the educational 
attainments of the entrepreneurs in the informal and formal sectors across the six 
countries.  (Appendix 3 shows educational attainment in all categories for informal and 
formal microenterprises).  We are far more likely to see owners with university degrees 
operating firms in the informal sector in East Africa than in Southern Africa, where firms 
are clearly sorted according to managerial talent. 
 
Figure 11:  Pct of Firm Owners with Primary or University Education 
 
 
Informal entrepreneurs have lower levels of education than those in formal firms in all 
countries except Tanzania and Uganda where the distinction is insignificant. The sharpest 
difference by far is in South Africa; it is astonishing that there, despite the relatively 
strong human capital base of the country, informal entrepreneurs have lower levels of 
education than comparable businessmen in any other country.  One possible factor is that 
the opportunity cost of being an entrepreneur in the informal sector, in the form of a high 15 
 
formal sector wage, is particularly high in the South where skill-based wage gradients are 
relatively steep.  Namibia comes second; there is also a sizeable gap in Botswana and 
Kenya.  
 
Race is not a direct sorting mechanism in our analysis because it will proxy for the 
capability-related variables, in particular education.  The vast majority of 
microenterprises our sample are Black-owned (Table 2).  South Africa has the smallest 
share of micro formals (67 percent) that are Black-owned while Uganda has the highest at 
100 percent.  Histories of race discrimination will have fed into the education system and 
may affect the nature of the business environment (for example, access to finance or 
other services) across or within the countries in our sample--our model does allow us to 










Table 2: Share of Black-Owned Firms in the Sample 
 
  Informal micro  Formal micro  Formal small 
Botswana  0.96 0.90 0.76 
Kenya  0.99 0.79 0.63 
Rwanda  1.00 0.96 0.86 
South  Africa  0.92 0.67 0.39 
Tanzania  0.96 0.97 0.77 
Uganda  0.96 1.00 0.87 
Namibia  0.99 0.93 0.74   
 
 
From other studies across Africa, education is a key driver of rates of firm growth, except 
for certain “networked” firms owned and operated by ethnic minorities (Ramachandran 
and Shah, 2006).  As discussed further below, there is also a strong relationship between 
educational attainment and productivity in Southern Africa, as well as between both of 
these variables and the likelihood of being formally registered.  In contrast, there is little 
difference in education levels between formal and informal firms in Tanzania and 
Uganda, and also little productivity gap.   
 
The model described in the previous section assumes that concealment costs are convex 
in employment size, so that the average as well as the marginal concealment cost will 
increase as a firm gets larger. The degree of convexity will depend on the overall strength 
of the business environment, as reflected in the enforcement of business tax laws and 16 
 
codes of regulation as well as in the higher opportunity cost of formality (the provision of 
public services such as electricity etc).  To the extent that enforcement and the provision 
of public services are characterized by a high degree of arbitrariness and variability, the 
concealment function will be less sharply convex.  Therefore, it would pay for an 
entrepreneur in one country to remain informal while a similar entrepreneur in another 
country would be better off by operating formally.   
 
The productivity and education comparisons suggest that the decision to register formally 
in East Africa might be a somewhat random or idiosyncratic one, as costs and 
opportunity costs of formality remain low across the size distribution of firms.  The 
benefits of formal registration might not be realized because of poor delivery of financial 
or other services, or because the main concern of businesses—such as reliable power—is 
similar for formal and informal firms.  Conversely, the costs of non-formalization might 
not be so high either, perhaps because inspectors are equally likely to seek bribes whether 
a firm is formal or informal.  Other work (Emery, 2003) has drawn attention to a high 
degree of arbitrariness in the business climate in many African countries.   In contrast, if 
the business climates of the Southern African countries are relatively strong (taking into 
account enforcement as well as the de jure constraints tabulated in Doing Business); 
individuals with the capabilities to benefit from the opportunities opened up by 
formalization will tend to formalize.   
 
Benefits of Formality.   
 
The benefits of formality lie in the access to public services and business support 
services, access to formal banking sector or micro finance, and availability of basic 
infrastructure facilities such as electricity, telephone, public sewage, as well as premises. 
In countries where these services are well developed, we would expect the informal 
sector to be smaller, and a sharper difference between the performance characteristics of 
informal versus formal microenterprises, ceteris paribus-only firms that have very low 
productivity/profitability will choose informality.   
  
Examining reported infrastructure access (electricity, water and sewage), presented in 
Figures 12-16 we see that for firms in all six countries, infrastructure constraints are in 
fact greater for informal firms, compared to formal enterprises.   Infrastructure access 
could provide incentives for firms to formalize.  The benefits to formalization are clearly 
higher in terms of infrastructure for Southern African firms but much less so in Uganda 
and Tanzania.  In Kenya, the difference in access to infrastructure is fairly large.   
 
 
































The data on access to finance also show some differences between the two sets of 
countries.  In all of the East African countries, access to a loan is actually higher for 
informal firms than for such firms in any of the Southern African countries.  Figure 15 
shows that access to external sources of finance for working capital is higher for informal 18 
 
firms in East Africa than in Southern Africa.  Figure 16 shows that a large percentage of 
firms in Uganda and Tanzania have bank accounts even though they are in the informal 
sector.  Finally, Table 3 shows that informal microenterprises finance a much higher 
share of working capital externally in East Africa than in Southern Africa. 19 
 










Botswana 17  32  9 
Namibia 18  39  3 
South 
Africa 16  32  2 
Kenya 27  36  13 
Tanzania 26  26  12 
Uganda 22  24  22 
 
 
Costs of Formality 
 
Another factor driving the decision to become formal is the cost of formality. A firm with 
a given level of productivity may choose informality in a country which has higher tax 
rates and much greater compliance costs, compared to countries where such costs are 
low.  Figure 17 shows that a very high share of both formal and informal firms in Kenya 
and Uganda pay bribes and a lower but equal share of firms in the formal and informal 
sector in Tanzania pay bribes as well.  In South Africa, the share of firms making bribe 
payments in the informal sector is higher than in the formal sector, suggesting that the 
rule of law provides a degree of protection to formal firms.
6     
 
 
Figure 17: Percentage reporting that bribe 
payments are required 





                                                 
6 Kaplinsky 1995 and Manning and Mashigo 1993 note that both small informal firms and owner-
operators are particularly likely to suffer from violence and insecurity in South Africa.   20 
 
Figure 18 indicates that visits from tax inspectors are likely to be higher for formal firms 
in every country but the share of firms visited in East Africa is much higher than in 
Southern Africa.  Kenyan firms are equally likely to be visited, whether or not they are in 
the informal sector.  In Southern Africa, harassment by tax inspectors is a lot lower, 
especially for firms in the informal sector.  
 
Country indicators are consistent our findings that countries within the Southern and 
Eastern African block differ considerably in their business environments.  Botswana, 
Namibia and South Africa are middle income countries, with relatively good governance 
and regulatory environments, while countries in East Africa are lower income, with 
mixed regulatory and governance conditions. Table 4 shows a number of indicators that 
might be relevant to understanding the business environment across the seven countries 
in our sample.   Overall, these external sources of data corroborate the country-level 
differences that we identify in our descriptive charts above. 
 
 





















Botswana 5180  48  63.9  0.49  0.70  0.90 
Kenya 530  83  27.0  -0.06  -0.59  -0.94 
Namibia 2990  42  46.9  0.58  0.17  0.19 
Rwanda 230 158  15.8  -1.24  -0.37  -0.09 
South 
Africa 4960  32  63.3  0.74  0.72  0.32 
Tanzania 340  142  25.3  0.15  -0.42  -0.45 
Uganda 280 107  25.5  -0.47  -0.40  -0.76 
Sources: World Bank Doing Business Indicators, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi Governance Indicators, 
Institutional Investor. 
 
South Africa, Botswana and Namibia consistently score well in terms of governance 
dimensions relative to the East African group.  Rwanda emerges as a distinctive case—
high scores relative to East Africa in dimensions related to government effectiveness and 
control of corruption but low in the area of voice and accountability – a pattern very 
consistent with the tight control over informal business noted above.  Similarly, the 












5.  The probability of formalizing 
 
In this section, we summarize the results of Probit models that estimate the likelihood of 
formalization (the full regressions are presented in Appendix 4).
7  Table 5 shows the 
significance of size, education, and measures related to the business environment in 
determining formality.  Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the predictions 
of the model.  The probability of being formal is correlated with firm size in every 
country except Rwanda.  Managerial talent (as proxied by educational attainment) is 
significant in determining likelihood of registering, ceteris paribus, for firms in Southern 
Africa and Kenya.  But it does not play a role in determining formality in Tanzania, 
Uganda or Rwanda.  Female ownership is correlated with informality in only two 
countries—Namibia and Rwanda—in all others, it is not a significant driver of firm 
status.   
 
The benefits of formality (access to public services, external financing) are clearly 
driving the decision to formalize in Southern Africa and Kenya, while in Tanzania and 
Uganda, they are not likely to drive the decision.  Interestingly, in Namibia, Uganda, 
Kenya, and Rwanda the likelihood of bribe payments increases the chances of 
formalization suggesting that formalization does not necessarily increase access to the 
protection of the law.  In South Africa, however, the opposite is true.    The regressions 
also confirm that access to finance is likely to be a significant driver of the decision to 
formalize, except in Tanzania and Uganda.   
 
                                                 
7 Inequality (6) from section 3 provides a structure for  the Probits, with the difference 
) , , ( ) , , , , ( u w x t t u w x i w f D π π π π − =
 providing the latent variable underlying the formality dummy 
D  such that  1 = D  for firms for which  0 ≥ D π  and  0 = D  if  0 < D π , where we assume that  we can 
express  D π  a stochastic function of a vector of observable determinants of or proxies , Z , of management 
talent, , x  factor prices, w  and u , and tax rates,  w t  and  π t  such that  i Di Z ε γ π + =
'
 , where  i ε  a 




Table 5: Determinants of formalization   
(X denotes statistical significance)  
 Botswana  Namibia South 
Africa 
Tanzania Uganda Kenya Rwanda
Firm size  X  X  X  X  X  X   
Inspector 
visits 









X X  X     X   
Owner is 
female 
 X(-)          X(-) 
External 
financing 
X X  XX       X  XX 
Bank 
account 
X X      X  X 
Pays 
bribes 
 X  X(-)    X  X  X 
Note:   X notes significance at either the 5 percent or the 1 percent level.   XX  notes cases where very 




6  Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the relative characteristics of informal and formal firms can 
differ across countries, by showing the distinct patterns that emerge from an analysis 
covering East and Southern Africa.  Many studies simply assign firms to formal and 
informal categories based on their size.  Here we are able to assign micro firms (those 
with less than 5 employees) into formal and informal categories on the basis of tax 
registration, and also to compare them with small formal firms with between 5 and 10 
employees.   
 
In Southern Africa, and particularly in South Africa, there is a sharp bifurcation of the 
micro firms.    Formal micro-firms have high labor productivity, at very similar levels to 
the small formal firms.  This suggests that some sorting mechanism is at work, creating 
incentives for some entrepreneurs and their firms to operate in the formal sector.  These 
formal micro-entrepreneurs are likely to have the capabilities to grow their firms, at least 
into small businesses; indeed, a survey suggests considerable upward size mobility within 
the South African formal sector (Clarke et al, 2007).   
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Informal firms in Southern Africa on the other hand have very low labor productivity, as 
little as one-tenth that of the formal sector.   We believe that business environments are 
less likely to be the cause of this bifurcation.  Compliance costs tend to be lower and 
infrastructure and financial services are more likely to be delivered in the South if firms 
become formal.  Indeed, vulnerability to bribe-taking officials (which is sometimes cited 
as a disincentive to formalization) is greater among informal firms.  Yet is seems that 
informal forms are not fully denied services; a few use banking services and other 
amenities.   
 
What does this mean for the informal firms in Southern Africa?  Our data suggest that, 
first, it is vital to distinguish micro-firms from informal firms.  Many of the latter face 
internal barriers, in terms of management abilities and productivity, that will make it very 
difficult to cross over the productivity chasm that separates informal from formal firms.  
In South Africa for example, not one single firm in the informal sample was run by a 
university graduate.  In addition to the other sorting factors, the opportunity cost of being 
a formal sector employee will be high for such individuals.  This is in marked contrast to 
East Africa, where many informal firms are run by individuals with relatively high 
educational qualifications.  For many firms in the informal sector in Southern Africa, it is 
not clear that they would be able to take advantage of the potentially expanded range of 
opportunities that could be expected to come from fully formal status.  While there will 
always be exceptions, the informal sector in Southern Africa captured by the survey 
appears to be essentially composed of survivalist firms.  
 
What might help these firms? Access to training programs and simple technical 
assistance may help to some degree. One of the areas that the South African informal 
firms complain about in the survey is lack of access to premises.
8  Some provisions here 
might ease their survival.  But expanding employment in the formal sector, including in 
the many high-productivity micro-firms that are shown to exist by the survey, might be 
more useful than trying to “grow” informal firms.  Whether such efforts should include 
entry wage subsidies or other approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.  Given the 
low educational status of most informal entrepreneurs, it is difficult to see a route to 
higher-productivity employment that does not include the building of human capital, 
though this will be a lengthy process. 
 
The picture is quite different in East Africa.  There, especially in Uganda and Tanzania, 
there are indications that essentially similar firms make different decisions on whether to 
become fully formal.  The informal sector includes many higher-productivity micro-
enterprises with the capabilities to formalize and grow; the entrepreneurs running these 
firms are often well-educated and have access to a range of business services.  Why these 
firms make the decisions they do plausibly relates to the business environment and its 
various weaknesses.  Our analysis suggests that there may well be gains from improving 
the business environment to “crowd in” these firms into the formal sector and to widen 
                                                 
8 Rogerson 1992 notes the legacy of slum clearance and other periodic attacks on the illegal spaces 
within which informal enterprises thrive.  While many restrictions have been progressively lifted, there 
were still lingering controls and repressive bye-laws at the time of the survey.    24 
 
the pool of formal micro- firms that can serve as a seedbed for small formal firms and 
beyond. This is not to say that efforts in these countries should not also include the 
building of human skills.  From these efforts, we would also, however, expect duality to 
emerge.  In a stronger business environment, the informal sector will more likely be 
composed of survivalist firms.   
 
The case of Rwanda raises a distinctive question.  How stringent should formalization 
requirements be at an early stage of development?  Does a stringent registration and tax 
policy lead to a well-regulated and increasingly productive micro-seedbed for growth?  
Or, will it stultify the growth of the entire small-scale business sector?  Only time will 











The World Bank Enterprise Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa cover establishments located 
in all major regions of a country, in the following industries (according to ISIC Revision 
3.1)--all manufacturing sectors (group D), construction (group F), retail and wholesale 
services (sub-groups 52 and 51 of group G), hotels and restaurants (group H), transport, 
storage, and communications (group I), and computer and related activities (sub-group 72 
of group K).  For establishments with five or more full-time permanent paid employees, 
this universe was stratified according to the following categories of industry: 
 
1.  Manufacturing: Food and Beverages (Group D, sub-group 15); 
2.  Manufacturing: Garment (Group D, sub group 18); 
3.  Manufacturing: Other Manufacturing (Group D excluding sub-groups 15 and 18); 
4.  Retail Trade: (Group G, sub-group 52); 
5.  Rest of the universe of firms, including: 
 
•  Construction (Group F); 
•  Wholesale trade (Group G, sub-group 51); 
•  Hotels, bars and restaurants (Group H); 
•  Transportation, storage and communications (Group I); 
•  Computer related activities (Group K, sub-group 72). 
 
The survey also sampled a selection of micro establishments (establishments with less 
than five full-time permanent paid employees) from the targeted universe, without 






The sampling methodology implemented varied by strata and region, depending on the 
characteristics of the population.  With respect to establishments with five or more 
employees, the following approaches were applied (according to survey region and 
industrial stratum): 
 
For the three manufacturing strata, a required second level of stratification (after sector) 
was firm size, defined as: small (5-19 employees), medium (20-99 employees) and large 
(100 and more employees).  
 
In all surveys, the micro establishment stratum covers all establishments of the targeted 
categories of economic activity with less than 5 employees. For many reasons including 
the small size of establishments, their expected high rate of turnovers, and the high level 
of “informality” of establishments in many activities, the surveyors selected an aerial 
sampling approach to estimate the population of establishments and select the sample in 
this stratum for all regions of the survey.  Aerial sampling consists of indentifying 
neighborhoods/clusters of informal sector activity, then dividing these into blocks and 
surveying door to door to identify and collect data on microenterprises.  Sample sizes 
were chosen with the purpose of getting estimates with 5 percent precision at 90 percent 
confidence intervals with all variables that are 0/1 (yes/no and percentages).  This 
implies, of course, that estimates using cost data do not have the same level of precision. 
 
Also, the blocks, once identified, are then randomly chosen for surveying. So, not all 
blocks are surveyed.  This is the next best solution to random selection from a population 
list and one which is often used when no population list is available. 
 
The final dataset contains information on sample weights for this group, which 
approximates the number of micro-enterprises found in the population.  
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Appendix 2:  Propositions derived from the model of formality 
 
 
The rent functions  ) , , , , ( π π t t u w x w f   and   ) , , ( u w x i π  are defined for all 
entrepreneurs 0 : x x x ≥  . Although for each only one of  f π   or  i π  is realized for any one 
entrepreneurs, we assume that the other is also known to the entrepreneur as a notional 
value, and that that x is in the formal sector if   ) , , ( ) , , , , ( u w x t t u w x i w f π π π ≥  and in the 
informal sector otherwise.  Given this sorting rule and our other assumptions, the 
following propositions can be proved about the size distributions, relative earnings, and 
TFP and labor productivity gaps of the formal and informal sectors of the economy.
9 
 
Proposition 1: The most talented entrepreneurs are always in the formal sector  
 
For any given set of factor prices and tax rates, there is a threshold management talent 
level, x x ˆ = , defining the firm at the margin of formality and  informality such that  
 








) , , ( ) , , , , ( u w x t t u w x i w f π π π <  if   x x ˆ <  
 
In other words, every entrepreneur in the informal sector has less management talent than 
every entrepreneur in the formal sector. 
 
Proposition 2 : Higher taxes would push more talented entrepreneurs into the informal 
sector 
Equation (5) defines the talent level of the marginal formal sector entrepreneur, x x ˆ = , as 
an implicit function of   , , , w t u w  and  π t , which function can be differentiated to show that 
x ˆ  increases in each tax rate  w t  and  π t .  It follows that, the higher is either of these tax 
rates, the higher the share of the informal in the total population of firms, and the higher 
is the average entrepreneurial talent in the informal sector. 
 
Proposition 3: Informal firms are always smaller than formal firms 
 
                                                 
9 Proofs are available from the authors. 27 
 
This is in the sense that every informal firm is smaller, in employment terms, than every 
formal sector firm.  The minimum firm size in the formal sector is  ) , , , ˆ ( u t w x n w f  while 
the largest informal sector firm has employment size   ) , , ˆ ( u w x ni  so that 
) , , , ˆ ( ) , , , ( u t w x n u t w x n w f w f ≥  for every formal firm  x  and  ) , , ˆ ( ) , , ( u w x n u w x n i i <  for 
every informal firm.   
 
Proposition 4: The missing- middle hypothesis 
 
There is discontinuity between the size distribution of formal firms and the size 
distribution of informal firms. This is in the sense that the employment size of the 
marginal formal sector firm  x x ˆ =  is smaller than what the same firm would employ in 
the informal sector, that is,  ) , , ˆ ( ) , , , ˆ ( u w x n u t w x n i w f > . In other words, there is a gap 
between the minimum employment size of formal firms and the maximum employment 
size of informal firms. 
 
Proposition 5: Informal entrepreneurs earn less than owners in the formal sector 
 
This is in the sense that profits per firm are lower in the informal sector. For any firm 
1 x x =  observed in the informal sector and any firm  2 x x =  observed in the formal sector, 
we have ) , , ( ) , , , , ( 1 2 u w x t t u w x i w f π π π > . This is in fact a corollary of Proposition 1, 
which implies that  x x ˆ 1 <  and  x x ˆ 2 ≤   so that  ) , , , , ˆ ( ) , , , , ( 2 π π π π t t u w x t t u w x w f w f ≥  and 
) , , ( ) , , , , ˆ ( 1 u w x t t u w x i w f π π π > . 
 
Proposition 6: Informal firms are less productive than formal firms 
 
This is in the sense that total factor productivity any informal firms is lower than total 
factor productivity in any formal firm. This too follows form Proposition 1. The Lucas 
model should be interpreted as one of selection (into entrepreneurship or informality) on 
total factor productivity, given that management talent can only be partially observable.  
For example, under the assumption of Gibrat’s Law (that firms grow at a uniform mean 
rate independent of initial size) made in much of the Lucas (1978), the production 
function is of the form:
2 1 ) (
λ λ n k x A y = , where x x A α = ) ( i s  T F P ,   0 > α  and 
1 , 0 2 1 < < λ λ .  Underlying the size distribution of firms in the baseline model is therefore 
an inter-firm dispersion in TFP, which is increasing monotonically over the size spectrum 
starting from lowest observation for the marginal firm.  Thus for any two firms  1 x x =  
and 2 x x = , and a given set of factor prices w and u ,  their employment size ratio  would 
be a monotonic transformation of their relative total factor productivities:   

























Proposition 7:  The densities of labor productivity in the formal and informal sector 
overlap 
 
Total factor productivity is unambiguously lower in the informal sector than in the formal 
sector in the sense that the ) (x A of every informal firm is smaller than that of every formal 
firm. And in general labor productivity is higher in the formal sector for that reason.  
However, there is significant overlap between the probability density of labor 
productivity in the formal sector and the density of labor productivity in formal firms due 
to the convexity of concealment costs. 
 
 Proposition 8: The extent of overlap in the densities of labor productivity decreases in 
the convexity of concealment costs in the informal sector 
 
The range of x (or subset of firms) over which the density of labor productivity in the 
formal sector overlaps with the density of labor productivity in informal firms depends on 
the curvature of the concealment cost function, the range being smaller the more convex 
is the cost of concealment, that is the greater is,  )) ( (
' ' x n c . Arguably the curvature of the 
concealment cost function will be greater the higher is government’s ability or 
willingness to enforce tax laws. If that is indeed the case, then the degree of overlap in 
the density of labor productivity between the formal and informal sectors will be smaller 












Appendix 4: Econometric Estimations of the Decision to Formalize 
                
Model I:  Impact of Education (Categorical dummies) on Decision to Formalize  
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.49  ‐1.56***  ‐0.67* ‐ 1.77***  0.12 ‐ 0.03  0.21 
  (0.336)  (0.574)  (0.374)  (0.468)  (0.454)  (0.386)  (0.579) 
secdary  0.41  0.64  0.18  0.41  0.85  0.01  0.85** 
  (0.346)  (0.706)  (0.450)  (0.727)  (0.779)  (0.544)  (0.424) 
vocat  0.99***  1.38***  0.21  0.74  0.55  0.14  0.43 
  (0.382)  (0.569)  (0.398)  (0.497)  (0.481)  (0.449)  (0.381) 
univ  1.46***  1.35***  1.13***  1.83***  0.56  0.12  0.56 
  (0.405)  (0.542)  (0.413)  (0.485)  (0.480)  (0.403)  (0.435) 
retailit  ‐0.12  0.63* ‐ 0.03 ‐ 0.28 ‐ 0.64* ‐ 0.13  0.78 
  (0.305)  (0.324)  (0.298)  (0.336)  (0.332)  (0.285)  (0.587) 
female  0.20 ‐ 0.36 ‐ 0.66**  0.31 ‐ 0.39  0.15 ‐ 0.62** 
   (0.290)  (0.281)  (0.298)  (0.277)  (0.361)  (0.282)  (0.286) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 
Log Likelihood  ‐72.199 ‐ 59.413 ‐ 49.592 ‐ 56.513 ‐ 40.668 ‐ 67.465 ‐ 54.924 
             
Model 2: Impact of Firm Size on Decision to Formalize
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.83*** ‐ 1.16*** ‐ 0.63** ‐ 0.81*** ‐ 0.09 ‐ 0.58 ‐ 0.61 
  (0.332)  (0.397)  (0.300)  (0.301)  (0.411)  (0.403)  (0.734) 
Log(Workers)  0.99***  0.75***  0.86***  0.32*  0.66**  0.38*  0.49* 
  (0.200)  (0.228)  (0.242)  (0.184)  (0.313)  (0.215)  (0.271) 
retailit  0.18  0.90*** ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.41 ‐ 0.48  0.08  1.39** 
  (0.302)  (0.332)  (0.320)  (0.329)  (0.343)  (0.303)  (0.692) 
female  0.24 ‐ 0.46* ‐ 0.89***  0.06 ‐ 0.35  0.25 ‐ 0.54* 
   (0.292)  (0.277)  (0.329)  (0.266)  (0.346)  (0.289)  (0.296) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  101  85  107  65  98  101 
Log Likelihood  ‐67.34 ‐ 59.80 ‐ 42.34 ‐ 62.65 ‐ 39.24 ‐ 65.94 ‐ 50.54 
              
Model 3: Impact of Education (Continuous Variable‐years of Education) on Decision to 
Formalize
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐3.42*** ‐ 2.30*** ‐ 2.43***  5.88*** ‐ 0.19 ‐ 0.59 ‐ 1.11 
  (1.154)  (0.986)  (0.823)  (1.271)  (1.352)  (0.986)  (1.126) 
years of educ.  0.34***  0.17**  0.20***  0.45***  0.07  0.06  0.14 
  (0.111)  (0.077)  (0.071)  (0.103)  (0.113)  (0.081)  (0.095) 
retailit  ‐0.15  0.59* ‐ 0.19 ‐ 0.28 ‐ 0.78*** ‐ 0.08  0.78 
  (0.361)  (0.325)  (0.333)  (0.337)  (0.343)  (0.292)  (0.605) 
female  0.55 ‐ 0.41 ‐ 0.77***  0.25 ‐ 0.36  0.01 ‐ 0.51* 
   (0.381)  (0.284)  (0.332)  (0.285)  (0.352)  (0.288)  (0.296) 
Number of 
Observations 
78  91  80  115  61  88  101 
Log Likelihood  ‐44.49 ‐ 56.70 ‐ 40.40 ‐ 53.61 ‐ 38.25 ‐ 60.52 ‐ 48.54 
                




   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.97*** ‐ 2.14*** ‐ 0.73* ‐ 1.73*** ‐ 0.47 ‐ 0.67 ‐ 0.83 
  (0.386)  (0.628)  (0.437)  (0.521)  (0.542)  (0.532)  (0.780) 
secdary  0.20  0.84  ‐0.19  0.28  0.78  ‐0.04  0.95** 
   (0.362)  (0.704)  (0.523)  (0.750)  (0.774)  (0.554)  (0.475) 
vocat  0.52  1.19**  ‐0.05  0.72  0.51  0.18  0.52 
   (0.411)  (0.579)  (0.454)  (0.522)  (0.488)  (0.454)  (0.406) 
univ  0.99***  1.11**  0.79*  1.76***  0.30  0.06  0.76 
   (0.434)  (0.554)  (0.468)  (0.529)  (0.503)  (0.409)  (0.461) 
Log(workers)  0.83***  0.69***  0.79***  0.08  0.69**  0.39*  0.46 
   (0.213)  (0.248)  (0.256)  (0.206)  (0.337)  (0.218)  (0.282) 
retailit  0.04  0.82*** ‐ 0.10 ‐ 0.15 ‐ 0.47  0.08  1.36* 
  (0.323)  (0.339)  (0.337)  (0.364)  (0.349)  (0.308)  (0.730) 
female  0.13 ‐ 0.33 ‐ 0.85***  0.24 ‐ (0.360)  0.28 ‐ 0.68** 
   (0.306)  (0.291)  (0.342)  (0.296)  (0.369)  (0.296)  (0.323) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  85  107  65  98  100 
Log Likelihood  ‐64.00 ‐ 55.38 ‐ 39.44 ‐ 52.20 ‐ 38.43 ‐ 65.80 ‐ 47.18 
              
Model 5: Impact of  Infrastructure (electricity, water and public sewage) on the Decision to 
Formalize
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.91***  ‐2.10*** ‐ 0.94*** ‐ 1.97***  0.06 ‐ 0.04 ‐ 0.06 
  (0.383)  (0.633)  (0.400)  (0.551)  (0.456)  (0.388)  (0.622) 
secdary  0.27  0.94 ‐ 0.35  0.40  0.87 ‐ 0.02  0.88** 
  (0.372)  (0.742)  (0.520)  (0.873)  (0.781)  (0.549)  (0.426) 
vocat  0.65  1.38*** ‐ 0.10  0.74  0.44  0.09  0.37 
  (0.418)  (0.597)  (0.431)  (0.584)  (0.494)  (0.455)  (0.382) 
univ  1.00***  1.11*  0.47  1.49***  0.42  0.07  0.49 
  (0.442)  (0.573)  (0.475)  (0.567)  (0.500)  (0.408)  (0.452) 
retailit  ‐0.03  0.80***  0.005 ‐ 0.63 ‐ 0.55 ‐ 0.12  1.06* 
  (0.330)  (0.338)  (0.322)  (0.405)  (0.344)  (0.286)  (0.643) 
female  0.25 ‐ 0.26 ‐ 0.94***  0.04 ‐ 0.46  0.13 ‐ 0.65** 
  (0.315)  (0.290)  (0.332)  (0.315)  (0.370)  (0.283)  (0.294) 
Infrastructure 
Services 
1.16***  0.82***  1.26***  1.46***  0.37  0.24 ‐  
   (0.267)  (0.319)  (0.363)  (0.322)  (0.379)  (0.306)  
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 
Log Likelihood  ‐62.38 ‐ 56.00 ‐ 42.94 ‐ 45.45 ‐ 40.20 ‐ 67.16 ‐ 53.41 
              
              
Model 6: Access to Formal Banking (checking account) on the decision to Formalize
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda  
Intercept  ‐1.45*** ‐ 1.85*** ‐ 1.14*** ‐ 1.76*** ‐ 0.14 ‐ 0.41 ‐ 0.04  
  (0.457)  (0.650)  (0.444)  (0.470)  (0.504)  (0.395)  (0.613)  
secdary  0.38  0.75 ‐ 0.06  0.23  0.85  0.03  0.76  
  (0.377)  (0.722)  (0.477)  (0.755)  (0.802)  (0.545)  (0.469)  
vocat  0.68  1.39*** ‐ 0.12  0.62  0.59  0.001  0.43  
  (0.417)  (0.577)  (0.442)  (0.505)  (0.496)  (0.463)  (0.424)  
univ  1.35***  1.35***  0.73  1.45***  0.42  0.01  0.32  32 
 
  (0.429)  (0.550)  (0.450)  (0.529)  (0.500)  (0.411)  (0.489)  
retailit  ‐0.22  0.60* ‐ 0.02 ‐ 0.30 ‐ 0.61* ‐ 0.16  0.77  
  (0.331)  (0.327)  (0.311)  (0.343)  (0.338)  (0.287)  (0.626)  
female  0.39 ‐ 0.29 ‐ 0.64**  0.17 ‐ 0.59  0.17 ‐ 0.81***  
  (0.320)  (0.290)  (0.309)  (0.293)  (0.392)  (0.285)  (0.322)  
Bank Deposit 
account 
1.43***  0.36  1.00***  0.56*  0.54  0.32  1.14***  
   (0.332)  (0.329)  (0.370)  (0.322)  (0.384)  (0.282)  (0.337) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 
Log Likelihood  ‐61.50 ‐ 58.81 ‐ 45.52 ‐ 55.01 ‐ 39.67 ‐ 66.81 ‐ 48.19 
              
              
              
Model 7: Impact of Formal sector borrowing on decision to formalize 
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.46 ‐ 1.60*** ‐ 0.75* ‐ 1.82***  0.13  0.24  0.20 
  (0.343)  (0.574)  (0.403)  (0.470)  (0.453)  (0.432)  (0.586) 
secdary  0.09  0.64  0.14  0.27  0.88 ‐ 0.25  0.96** 
  (0.364)  (0.705)  (0.476)  (0.757)  (0.781)  (0.575)  (0.447) 
vocat  0.68*  1.22**  0.16  0.74  0.55 ‐ 0.11  0.43 
  (0.409)  (0.575)  (0.417)  (0.496)  (0.479)  (0.484)  (0.418) 
univ  1.25***  1.29***  0.81*  1.66***  0.58 ‐ 0.03  0.63 
  (0.421)  (0.542)  (0.461)  (0.491)  (0.483)  (0.427)  (0.458) 
retailit  ‐0.19  0.58* ‐ 0.12 ‐ 0.30 ‐ 0.64* ‐ 0.20  0.59 
  (0.321)  (0.328)  (0.325)  (0.340)  (0.332)  (0.289)  (0.596) 
female  0.35 ‐ 0.27 ‐ 0.63*  0.27 ‐ 0.37  0.12 ‐ 0.65** 




   0.94**  2.03***  0.61*  ‐0.15  ‐0.76  
      (0.475)  (0.641)  (0.316)  (0.433)  (0.463)    
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 




              
              
Model 8: Burden of Inspections and the decision to formalize 
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.98*** ‐ 1.62*** ‐ 0.83** ‐ 1.77*** ‐ 0.71 ‐ 0.81  0.29 
  (0.388)  (0.592)  (0.398)  (0.536)  (0.591)  (0.497)  (0.580) 
secdary  0.31  0.70  0.26  0.41  1.13  0.03  0.82* 
  (0.378)  (0.718)  (0.464)  (0.727)  (0.885)  (0.574)  (0.424) 
vocat  0.70*  1.39***  0.33  0.74  0.58  0.33  0.44 
  (0.416)  (0.576)  (0.412)  (0.499)  (0.565)  (0.478)  (0.387) 
univ  1.54***  1.35***  1.13***  1.83***  0.48  0.16  0.66 
  (0.440)  (0.549)  (0.420)  (0.485)  (0.567)  (0.425)  (0.448) 
retailit  ‐0.09  0.63*  0.01 ‐ 0.28 ‐ 1.18*** ‐ 0.06  0.88 
  (0.335)  (0.325)  (0.303)  (0.336)  (0.415)  (0.296)  (0.592) 
female  0.15 ‐ 0.38 ‐ 0.63**  0.31 ‐ 0.90**  0.37 ‐ 0.57* 




1.33***  0.15  0.64  ‐0.003  1.82***  0.87*** ‐ 0.32 
   (0.276)  (0.279)  (0.463)  (0.317)  (0.469)  (0.307)  (0.316) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 
Log Likelihood  ‐59.47 ‐ 59.26 ‐ 48.64 ‐ 56.51 ‐ 31.46 ‐ 63.30 ‐ 54.41 
              
              
              
              
              
Model 9: Bribe Payments and the Decision to Formalize 
   South Africa  Botswana  Namibia  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Rwanda 
Intercept  ‐0.26 ‐ 1.56*** ‐ 0.63*  2.74***  0.11 ‐ 0.32  0.26 
  (0.359)  (0.574)  (0.375)  (0.702)  (0.463)  (0.423)  (0.578) 
secdary  0.50  0.64  0.09  0.36  0.85 ‐ 0.17  0.98*** 
  (0.357)  (0.706)  (0.461)  (0.744)  (0.781)  (0.559)  (0.436) 
vocat  1.09***  1.37***  0.03  0.83  0.55  0.04  0.37 
  (0.394)  (0.573)  (0.415)  (0.512)  (0.482)  (0.458)  (0.384) 
univ  1.38***  1.34***  1.02***  1.82***  0.56  0.07  0.36 
  (0.413)  (0.547)  (0.422)  (0.497)  (0.481)  (0.408)  (0.470) 
retailit  ‐0.14  0.63*  0.02 ‐ 0.26 ‐ 0.64* ‐ 0.01  0.65 
  (0.311)  (0.324)  (0.303)  (0.347)  (0.335)  (0.296)  (0.588) 
female  0.10 ‐ 0.37 ‐ 0.78***  0.31 ‐ 0.40  0.17 ‐ 0.73*** 
  (0.296)  (0.285)  (0.311)  (0.283)  (0.364)  (0.287)  (0.298) 
Bribe 
Payment 
‐0.54**  0.08  0.93*  1.05**  0.04  0.50*  0.84** 
   (0.259)  (0.327)  (0.528)  (0.530)  (0.339)  (0.282)  (0.431) 
Number of 
Observations 
120  99  99  124  65  98  127 
Log Likelihood  ‐70.00 ‐ 59.38 ‐ 48.02 ‐ 54.00 ‐ 40.66 ‐ 65.90 ‐ 52.72 
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